Mosely v. Owens, 108 Or App 685, rev den, 312 Or 527 (1991).
Trial court properly allowed an out-of-state expert for the plaintiff to testify regarding the care and treatment of a specialist in Roseburg, Oregon, even though the plaintiff’s expert conceded he had never been to that community and did not know the exact methods used by physicians there. Court of Appeals held that an expert who is otherwise qualified needs to be familiar with what constitutes proper medical treatment in a community similar to that where care was provided in order for the expert’s opinion to be admissible. Plaintiff’s expert met that requirement. Therefore, the defendant’s argument regarding lack of familiarity with the methods used by physicians in the community itself merely went to the weight of the testimony, not to its admissibility.
Jeffries v. Murdock, 74 Or App 38, rev den, 299 Or 584 (1985).
Trial court properly directed a verdict against patient's negligence claim where there was uncontradicted expert medical testimony that the physician did not breach the standard of care, even though the physician admitted to accidentally cutting a nerve while removing a subclavian aneurism. Additionally, no jury question was created under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because there was no medical testimony establishing that the cutting of plaintiff's nerve was more probably than not the result of negligence.
Tiedemann v. Radiation Therapy Consultants, P.C., 299 Or 238 (1985).
Plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant physician alleging that she did not give informed consent because the defendant failed to disclose the material risks involved in radiation therapy. Plaintiff also alleged medical negligence in other particulars. Defendant moved for summary judgment as to all claims, relying on the defendant physician’s affidavit that in her opinion the treatment plaintiff received met the standard of care. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Where a party is required to provide the opinion of an expert to establish a genuine issue of material fact, a defendant physician’s affidavit may conclusively establish that fact, and must be rebutted by a contradictory affidavit in order to avoid summary judgment on that issue. Expert testimony is generally required to establish the standard of care for medical negligence. In informed consent cases, expert testimony is not required to establish whether the physician informed the plaintiff of (1) procedure or treatment in general, (2) alternative methods or treatment, and (3) risks to the procedure or treatment. Expert testimony may be necessary to establish the standard of care if the patient requests a further explanation of procedures or treatment. The issue of what additional information should have been given to the patient to secure her informed consent for radiation treatment was a matter requiring expert testimony. Summary judgment against plaintiff's negligence and lack of informed consent claims was proper. The defendant physician's expert testimony went unrebutted by plaintiff's lay testimony and plaintiff did not offer a contradictory affidavit under ORCP 47E that "an unnamed qualified expert has been retained who is available and willing to testify to admissible facts or opinions creating a question of fact," leaving no genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Creasy v. Hogan, 292 Or 154 (1981).
Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against a podiatrist who had performed bunion surgery on both of plaintiff’s feet. Trial court correctly allowed expert medical opinion testimony from orthopedic surgeons regarding the podiatrist’s care of plaintiff. Where the principles, techniques, methods, practices or procedures of one medical branch are identical or generally the same as another branch, opinion evidence from a practitioner of one branch is admissible on a point concerning matters in another branch. Medical practitioners are entitled to have their treatment of a patient tested by the principles of the school of medicine to which they belong. Foundation must be laid showing an "appropriate similarity in procedures or techniques" between the two branches.
Expert testimony regarding the witness’s knowledge of the "standard of care" or the "standard of skill" is not proper. Expert witness should testify to his or her knowledge of the methods of customary and proper medical treatment in same or similar community.
Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174 (1971).
In most medical negligence cases, expert testimony is required to establish what the reasonable practice is in the community because it is not within the knowledge of an ordinary jury. However, if the jury is capable of deciding what is reasonable conduct without the assistance of an expert medical witness, no expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care.
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